I will acknowledge that when I describe the Israeli system as Apartheid, I’m using it in a colloquial sense, not a legal sense. Which I think is appropriate, because my purpose is to characterize the severity and urgency of the situation rather than prosecute the case in international court. But I can accept that it might fall short based on legal definitions (in part because Israel is familiar enough with international law that they usually take care in developing policy to try to avoid when possible making their violations easy to prosecute).
It’s a bit long, but the feature I think is useful is summed up here:
“If the Holocaust is the paradigmatic case for the crime of genocide and South Africa for that of apartheid, then the crime against the Palestinian people must be called the Nakba.”
The thesis, at least in my understanding, is that the situation is unique enough to fit poorly into the major categories we use for describing atrocities, and that it requires that we recognize it as the primary case for a novel form of ethnic oppression that incorporates elements of genocide and apartheid, but operates in a way that is ultimately unique to the specifics of this situation. I’m curious what you might think of that argument.
I actually think that all makes sense.
I will acknowledge that when I describe the Israeli system as Apartheid, I’m using it in a colloquial sense, not a legal sense. Which I think is appropriate, because my purpose is to characterize the severity and urgency of the situation rather than prosecute the case in international court. But I can accept that it might fall short based on legal definitions (in part because Israel is familiar enough with international law that they usually take care in developing policy to try to avoid when possible making their violations easy to prosecute).
I think if that’s the framework you’re applying, you might be interested in this law review (assuming you haven’t already read it): “The Ongoing Nakba: Towards a Legal Framework for Palestine,” by Rabea Eghbariah
It’s a bit long, but the feature I think is useful is summed up here:
The thesis, at least in my understanding, is that the situation is unique enough to fit poorly into the major categories we use for describing atrocities, and that it requires that we recognize it as the primary case for a novel form of ethnic oppression that incorporates elements of genocide and apartheid, but operates in a way that is ultimately unique to the specifics of this situation. I’m curious what you might think of that argument.
You should use it in the legal sense :)